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Abstract 
 
This paper looks at the value generated to shareholders by the announcement of mergers 
and acquisitions involving firms in the European Union over the period 1998-2000. Target 
firm shareholders receive on average a statistically significant excess return of 9% in a one-
month window centered on the announcement date. Acquirers’ excess returns are null on 
average. When distinguishing in terms of the geographical and sectoral dimensions of the 
merger deals, our main finding is that mergers in industries that had been previously under 
government control or that are still heavily regulated generate lower value than M&A 
announcements in unregulated industries. This low value creation in regulated industries 
becomes significantly negative when the merger involved two firms from different countries 
and was primarily due to the lower positive return that shareholders of the target firm 
enjoyed upon the announcement of the merger. This evidence is consistent with the 
existence of obstacles (such as cultural, legal, or transaction barriers) to the successful 
conclusion of this type of transaction, which decrease the probability that the merger will 
actually be completed as announced and, therefore, reduce its expected value. 
JEL Classification:  G34, G38, L44. 
Keywords: mergers and acquisitions, European Union, event study. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The introduction of the single currency in the European Union was perceived to be 
one of the key stepping stones towards the creation of a truly integrated single financial 
market in Europe. The deregulation of national markets and promotion of their integration to 
move towards a single European market was one of the key goals set at the Lisbon Summit 
as a precondition to achieving world leadership by the European Union. The integration of 
the corporate sector and the alignment of corporate ownership and structures along 
patterns driven by the economic structure of an integrated Europe are key to the 
accomplishment of this objective. The industrial structure across Europe is characterized by 
having relatively small firms with their activity heavily concentrated within their national 
borders, especially when compared to the industrial structure of the United States, an 
economic union of approximately the same size as the European Union (see Midelfart-
Knarvik et al., 2000). Furthermore, the concentration of activity that has been taking place in 
Europe is still very driven by national boundaries.  
The integration of the national economies, the increase in deregulation in a large 
number of economic sectors and the recent listing of a number of large European 
corporations previously controlled by national governments has decreased the cost of 
corporate acquisitions and transactions across European borders, thus facilitating the 
restructuring of the European corporate sector. In particular, the introduction of the euro 
should have decisively fostered this process, through two main mechanisms. Firstly, the 
introduction of the single currency, by contributing to the integration of national markets, 
increases the attractiveness of corporate restructuring both as a means of taking advantage 
of the potential opportunities stemming from increasing integration and as a device to 
protect national markets from a more competitive environment. Secondly, the 
implementation of EMU, by facilitating the integration of European financial markets, should 
make it easier to obtain the significant volumes of funds needed to finance M&A operations. 
In fact, the volume of M&A activity in Europe did rise significantly in the latter part of 
the nineties. After nearly doubling in 1998 and 1999, the volume of European M&As peaked 
that year at USD 1.529 billion. European merger activity significantly declined over the next 
two years to a total value of USD 532 billion in 2001. However, this increase in merger and 
acquisition activity has been part of a worldwide increase in corporate restructuring and is 
not unique to the European Union. The share of world M&A activity involving at least one 
European firm has remained approximately constant throughout the last ten years at around 
30%. Moreover, European merger activity has also remained heavily concentrated within 
national borders. Domestic mergers in Europe still account for the lion’s share of merger 
activity, representing more than 50% of all transactions involving a European firm (see 
European Commission, 2001). 
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In this respect, the lack of a specific boost to cross-border M&A operations within the 
euro-zone might be taken as a clear indication that there are still a large number of legal, 
economic and cultural burdens that deter this activity. Among these barriers, those of a 
regulatory nature should not be overlooked. Takeover rules differ widely among member 
states. Corporate takeover pills and similar provisions to protect existing management are 
common. Governments also maintain substantial ultimate control over who owns certain 
large firms through their use of golden shares and many regulatory and antitrust provisions 
require them to approve large M&A transactions. Attempts to standardize and promote 
European-wide regulation on merger activity have proven a failure.1  
The purpose of this paper is to analyse activity in the field of mergers and 
acquisitions involving European enterprises. We look at this issue by focusing on the extent 
that recent corporate acquisitions announced in the EU since the creation of the euro have 
resulted in a generation of shareholder value. Value creation for the shareholders of the 
target and acquiring firms is only a partial measure of the net social value generated by a 
corporate restructuring decision. Net social value includes other benefits such as increases 
in consumer welfare, or the net increase in the welfare of other stakeholders such as 
workers, suppliers and communities in which the firms operate. Focusing on shareholder 
returns however has the advantage of being easy to observe. More decisively, they also 
represent the best estimate at the time of the transaction of the expected present 
discounted value generated by the transaction.   
The paper focuses on analysis of differences in the intensity of value creation in 
different types of transaction. For this purpose, mergers and acquisitions are classified 
using two alternative criteria: the geographical scope of the merger and the degree of 
government involvement in the industry in which the deal takes place. This emphasis arises 
from the observation that the presence of institutional and policy barriers to European-wide 
restructuring is more likely to occur among international deals taking place in sectors that 
are regulated or with a large involvement of state-owned enterprises. Of course, firms 
involved in international transactions face many other structural issues and probably even 
harder ones, such as cultural integration, labour mobility, and different deeply rooted 
business cultures. However, from a policy perspective, the analysis of the effects that 
government involvement and regulation have on the success of cross-border activity seems 
pre-eminent, and most of the proposed regulatory changes have been directed at these 
issues. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section provides a literature 
survey of the wide evidence on the impact that mergers and acquisitions have on 
                                                                
1 Last year the European Commission withdrew its proposed directive on merger and acquisition activity in Europe. The 
main goals of this directive were to seek a common basis for some key terms, and a requirement that national rules should 
cover the basics of mandatory takeovers, with a particular focus on investor protection.  
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shareholder value creation. Section III describes the data that we use for our analysis and 
the methodology employed, and the descriptive information on excess returns from merger 
announcements.  Section IV describes the main results and section V concludes. 
 
II. SUMMARY OF THE LITERATURE 
There is a wide literature on the implications of mergers and acquisitions and the 
market for corporate control for value creation. We provide here a brief and partial survey of 
this literature focusing on two specific aspects: the evidence accumulated through event 
studies on the returns to shareholders of the target and acquiring firm accruing around the 
merger announcement; and, the existing evidence suggesting what type of firm 
characteristics make it more likely that a particular merger will generate or destroy 
shareholder value. In this summary, we focus on those recent papers that analyze samples 
of mergers that have taken place during the last decade. A more extensive survey of this 
literature going back in time can be found in Jensen and Ruback (1983), Datta et al. (1992) 
and Bruner (2001). 
II.1.EXCESS RETURNS TO TARGET FIRMS 
Target firm shareholders enjoy returns that are on average significantly positive in 
almost all cases. The findings of 11 studies, summarized in panel A of Table 1, reveal 
returns that are material and significant, despite variations in time period, type of deal 
(merger vs. tender offer), observation period, and measure of excess returns. These 
findings are consistent with those reported in previous surveys of this literature: Jensen and 
Ruback (1983), Datta et al. (1992) and Bruner (2001). These surveys report average 
abnormal returns in the 20%-30% range. The studies reported in Table 1 also show large 
abnormal returns, although significantly smaller for more recent transactions. Most of the 
studies find that excess returns occur in the days following the announcement, and in 
increase in the event window does seem to marginally increase the amount and 
significance of excess returns. Interestingly, positive abnormal returns are also detected in 
the days previous to the announcement date, suggesting that the market anticipates 
information on the deals. Negative returns are only reported in two of the studies for 
windows smaller than ten days, while negative returns are also reported for windows prior to 
the event date.2 In short, an M&A transaction delivers a premium return to target firm 
shareholders. 
 
                                                                
2 Buysschaert et al. (2002) and Danbolt (2002). 
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II.2. RETURNS TO BUYER FIRMS 
The pattern of findings about market-based returns to buyer firms’ shareholders is 
less conclusive. The evidence is evenly distributed between studies that report negative 
excess returns and those that report zero and slightly positive excess returns. Panel B of 
Table 1 summarizes the findings of 13 studies. These studies have been divided between 
those that report negative returns to shareholders and those finding positive or zero excess 
returns:  
Panel B1 of Table 1 lists 7 studies that report negative returns. The negative returns 
vary between less than one percent and five percent, with different windows, most of them 
including periods prior to the announcement date. These excess returns are in most cases 
also statistically significantly different from zero. Panel B2 of Table 1 enumerates 7 studies 
that report zero or positive returns to acquirers. These returns range from zero to seven 
percent and in most cases they are very small. In short, the findings are distributed rather 
evenly among studies showing value destruction and those showing value creation. Thus, 
we can conclude that on aggregate, abnormal (or market-adjusted) returns to buyer 
shareholders from M&A activity are essentially zero, or in other words, buyers essentially 
break even (i.e. that acquisitions tend to offer zero net present values, or equivalently, that 
investors earn their required return). 
Most of the reported excess returns seem to accrue only around the announcement 
date. Studies that analyze long-term returns to shareholders of acquiring firms tend to find a 
significant negative excess returns to acquirers3. Studies that focus on the excess returns 
after the completion of the transaction also tend to find significant negative returns to 
acquirers. Caves (1989) infers that these findings are due to “second thoughts” by bidders’ 
shareholders, and/or the release of new information about the deal. But interpretation of 
longer-run returns following the transaction is complicated by possibly confounding events 
that have nothing to do with the transaction. 
Again, this summary of findings is consistent with previous surveys. Nevertheless, 
Bruner (2001) suggests that his review of the empirical literature shows a slight tendency for 
returns to decline over time. Returns appear to be higher (more positive) in the 1960s and 
1970s than in the 1980s and 1990s, except for deals in technology and banking. In these 
industries returns to bidders increased in the 1990s.  
 
                                                                
3 Gregory and McCorriston (2002), Faccio et al. (2002) and Mahendra and Forsyth (2002) report significant long-term 
negative excess returns to acquirers. 
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II.3. RETURNS TO BUYER AND TARGET FIRMS COMBINED 
Findings of positive abnormal returns to the seller and breakeven returns to the 
buyer raise the question of the net economic gain from this event. Since typically the buyer 
is substantially larger than the target, it is important to take into account the size difference 
between the merging firms. Hence, a large percentage gain to the target shareholders could 
be more than offset by a small percentage loss to the buyer shareholders. A number of 
studies have examined this by forming a portfolio of the buyer and target firms and 
examining either their weighted average returns (weighted by the relative sizes of the two 
firms) or by examining the absolute dollar value of returns. In Table 2, we report the findings 
of 6 studies. Almost all of the studies report positive combined returns. Nevertheless, it is 
worth pointing out that the magnitude of the excess returns is relatively low and that Aktas 
et al. (2001), focusing on a sample of mergers conducted in the second half of the nineties, 
found that half of the deals were value destroying. Overall, the findings in Table 2 coincide 
with the previous evidence in the literature suggesting that M&As do result in a total 
increase in the combined shareholder value of the merging firms. 
II.4 DRIVERS OF VALUE IN A MERGER 
Three main value drivers have been highlighted by the literature in mergers: the 
existence of synergies, the importance of value investing, and the key role of management 
involvement.   
Synergies through either the development of economies of scale, cost reduction, or 
the elimination of duplicated activities are almost always mentioned as the justification for a 
merger. Diversifying (unrelated) mergers tend to be associated with worse performance 
than related mergers. The degree of relatedness between the businesses of the buyer and 
seller is positively associated with returns.4 There is also evidence that diversified firms 
trade at a discount relative to non-diversifying firms, although recent evidence suggests that 
this is not due to firms having diversified.5 Maquieira et al. (1998) found negative, but 
insignificant, returns to buyers in conglomerate deals and positive and significant returns to 
buyers in non-conglomerate deals. Houston, James, and Ryngaert (2001) studied the 
association of forecasted cost savings with revenue enhancements in bank mergers and 
found a significant relationship between the present value of these benefits and the returns 
forecast on the announcement day.  
                                                                
4 Comment and Jarrell (1995), Healy, Palepu and Ruback (1992 and 1997) among others provide evidence on the existence 
of value destruction from unrelated diversification. 
5 Lang and Stulz (1994) and Berger and Ofek (1995) provided the most comprehensive evidence on the existence of this 
diversification discount, while more recently Campa and Kedia (2002), Villalonga (2001), Maksimovic and Phillips (2002) 
provide results consistent with the existence of this discount even when firms are maximizing value. 
 8 BANCO DE ESPAÑA/DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.0223 
Value investment is also likely to generate positive returns. Value investment occurs 
when buyers purchase apparently cheap firms (low book-to-market ratios). Rau and 
Vermaelen (1998) found that buyers of companies with high book-to-market value ratios 
obtain significantly negative excess returns in merger deals, while value-oriented buyers 
earn significantly positive abnormal returns. Sellers also prefer cash to stock in a merger. 
Evidence suggests that stock deals are related with negative value creation while cash 
purchasers have zero or positive excess returns.6 
Finally, studies suggest that returns to buyer firm shareholders are positively related 
to share ownership by managers and employees. A related finding is that leverage and 
management buyouts (LBOs and MBOs) create value for buyers. The sources of these 
returns are not only from tax savings due to debt and depreciation shields. Gains also 
significantly accrue from efficiencies and greater operational improvements implemented 
after the buyout by the new managers who tend to have a significant portion of their net 
worth committed to the success of the transaction.7 
Most of the previous literature has focused on the value drivers to an M&A 
announcement that are specific to the firms or the business involved.  There has not been 
much analysis of the impact that the institutional context might have on the value that 
different type of transactions might generate. Our emphases in this paper is to identify 
whether systematic differences exist in the value generated by M&As in the European 
Union depending on the nationality of the firms involved and the characteristics of the 
industries in which they operate. 
 
III.EXCESS RETURNS: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
Excess returns from the announcement of an M&A event are calculated relative to 
the expected returns for windows of different length around the announcement date. The 
measure of excess return is calculated as the difference between the return to shareholders 
during the window, t, and the expected return to shareholders calculated on the basis of the 
CAPM model relative to each firm’s domestic stock market, with a beta parameter estimated 
with a window of 150 days prior to the announcement date. We have calculated three 
different measures of excess returns: excess returns to the shareholders of the acquiring 
firm, excess returns to the shareholders of the target firm, and the total excess returns from 
the merger, which are the average of the excess returns to both firms weighted by their 
relative market capitalizations. 
                                                                
6 Asquith, Bruner, and  Mullins (1987), Huang and Walkling (1989), Travlos (1987), and Yook (2000). 
7 You et al. (1986) and Healy, Palepu and Ruback (1997). 
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We have also used different windows in our calculation of the excess return 
measures to check for the robustness of our results to the specified window.  We have used 
windows of one week and one month, computed from the day prior to the announcement 
date.  We have also used windows centered around the announcement date and with a 
radius of one week and one month to take into account potential market reactions, prior to 
the announcement date, if agents anticipate information on the deal. We have used a final 
sample of 288 M&A announcements over the period 1998-2000. Each merger in our sample 
satisfies the following selection criteria: a) both the target and acquiring companies are from 
EU countries; b) the merging companies are listed; and c) information on total return to 
shareholders is available both for target and acquirer. We have tested the robustness of the 
results by using a wider sample consisting of those mergers for which information on either 
the target or the acquirer is available (unmatched panel) 8. 
Table 3 provides some information on the sample composition. The distribution of 
the sample across the EU member states is shown in panel A. Germany accounts for the 
largest proportion, followed at some distance by the UK, France and Italy. The proportion of 
mergers in which the target belongs to one of the five largest EU countries is around 70%. 
The corresponding figure for acquirers is slightly smaller. Comparing our sample with the 
total M&A population, proxied by the SDC M&A database (see European Commission, 
2001), UK deals seem to be underrepresented in our sample. As shown in panel B, a 
majority of M&A deals in our sample took place in financial services and in manufacturing. 
When comparing with the total population, mergers in the service sector seem to be 
underrepresented. Over time, the composition of our sample reflects the important growth in 
the number of operations that have taken place in 1999 and 2000. Finally, the share of 
domestic mergers in our sample (69%) is higher than the corresponding share in the SDC 
M&A database (54%)9. 
Table 4 presents the cumulative excess returns for merging firms in our basic 
sample based on various windows around the announcement date. The table provides the 
bootstrapped skewness-adjusted t-statistic as well as 5% confidence bands computed 
following the method described in Lyon et al. (1999).10  
Our results for the complete sample of mergers are consistent with those generally 
found in the event study literature analysing market-based returns to merging firms’ 
shareholders around the announcement date. Thus, we find that there are positive and 
significant abnormal returns to targets ranging from nearly 3% over the period (t-1, t+28) to 
around 9% over the period (t-30, t+30). Around 60% of the target firms display positive 
                                                                
8 See the Appendix for a detailed description of the sample selection process. 
9 The SDC M&A database is not only limited to transactions involving two companies from EU countries. Therefore, it 
includes a number of transactions in which one of the companies does not belong to a EU member state. This accounts for 
part of the difference in the proportion of cross-border transactions in the two datasets. 
10 The pattern of results does not significantly change when using the unmatched sample. 
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abnormal returns (see Table 5). However, on average for all mergers, there are no 
significant abnormal returns to acquiring firms. The share of acquiring firms displaying 
positive abnormal returns is very close to 50%. Overall, the increase in the net present 
value of acquiring companies around the merger announcement date is essentially zero (i.e. 
buyers earn their required return).  Additionally, it is worth emphasizing that, both for targets 
and buyers, there is a broad range of responses to the announcement of a merger deal 
from very positive to very negative. 
Figure 1 shows the distribution of excess returns to targets and acquirers for the 
different windows. The range of the distribution of returns increases with the size of the 
window. More interestingly, target returns are positively skewed while returns to acquirers 
are more symmetrically distributed. For instance, the 25th percentile of target returns over 
the window (t-1, t+5) is –2.0% and the 75th percentile is 5.9%. In contrast, for acquirers 
these percentile values are –2.6% and 2.1%, respectively. 
Looking at excess returns over the different windows also provides insight on the 
timing in which excess returns are on average generated. Excess returns for targets are 
mostly found within the window (t-30, t+5). In fact, excess returns over the window (t-1, t+5) 
are even larger than (although very close to) those found over the larger window (t-1, t+28). 
In general, it seems that abnormal returns are generated mostly up to the first week after 
the announcement date and that there is significant information in the market in the month 
previous to the formal announcement date.  
The question of the net economic gain from the announcement of an M&A deal can 
be addressed by examining a weighted average of the excess returns to target and buyer 
firms (weighted by their relative market values). For the whole sample of mergers, we find 
(see Table 5) that the joint excess returns range, depending on the window, from –0.4% to 
0.9% and the percentage of mergers creating value (i.e. with positive joint abnormal returns) 
varies between 47% and 56%. Therefore, it seems that the positive excess returns to 
targets are to a large extent offset by the zero excess returns to buyers, given that the 
acquiring firms are usually substantially larger than targets. 
National vs. cross-border mergers 
One of the goals of the paper is to find out whether significant barriers exist to the 
restructuring of corporate activity within the European Union. As already highlighted in the 
introduction, the industrial structure of the EU is more concentrated within national borders 
than what a truly single market would suggest. This implies that as barriers to cross-border 
transactions decrease this type of transaction will occur more frequently. In the absence of 
these barriers, we should expect the announcement of a cross-border merger to involve, on 
average, a generation of value at least as large as a similar transaction involving two 
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domestic firms. To the extent that these barriers are high, we would expect the likelihood 
that a cross-border merger will generate value to decrease. 
As a first step to ascertain to what extent the profitability of M&A activity differs 
depending on the national or cross-border nature of the transactions, this section presents 
some descriptive statistics on the excess returns enjoyed by the shareholders of the 
merging companies distinguishing between national and cross-border transactions. The 
evidence presented in Tables 4, 5 and 6 uniformly shows that average abnormal returns to 
targets and acquirers are larger in national mergers than in cross-border deals.  
This difference in average returns ranges from 0.1% to 1.7% in the case of targets, 
but is not significant (see Table 6). The percentage of target firms displaying positive excess 
returns is slightly higher for the sub-sample of national mergers (see Table 5). Thus, we find 
that merger premia paid to target shareholders are larger (although non significantly) in 
national deals, suggesting that buyers in cross-border mergers might face obstacles of a 
different nature that offset their advantages when entering new markets, resulting in a lower 
premium being paid to target shareholders. 
The difference between abnormal returns to acquirers in national mergers and 
abnormal returns to acquirers in cross-border mergers varies between 1.3% and 3.5% and 
is (or is close to) significant in most cases. On the one hand, abnormal returns to acquiring 
firms are positive and non-significant in national mergers. On the other hand, abnormal 
returns to acquiring firms are negative and weakly significant in cross-border mergers. 
Again, the percentage of acquiring firms displaying positive excess returns is slightly higher 
for the sub-sample of national mergers. Therefore, it seems that in spite of paying a smaller 
premium to target owners, shareholders of acquiring firms obtain lower benefits in cross-
border deals than in national transactions. 
Looking at the weighted average of the excess returns to target and buyer firms in 
national and cross-border deals, we find that there is a significant difference in the joint 
abnormal return that ranges, depending on the window, from 1.8% to 3.5%. More precisely, 
the average joint excess return is always positive for national mergers (depending on the 
window, it ranges from 0.2% to 1.9%) and always negative for cross-border deals 
(depending on the window, it ranges from -0.6% to -1.6%). 
It is not surprising that target returns do not significantly differ between national and 
cross-border mergers. Acquirers need to make on average a sufficiently attractive offer for 
the existing shareholders to transfer their ownership. However, acquiring firms get heavily 
penalised for engaging in a cross-border merger. Not because they pay too much, but 
because the expected value of the proposed cross-border transaction is low. 
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Mergers in regulated industries vs. mergers in unregulated industries 
We compare excess returns arising from merging processes taking into account the 
type of activity in which the target firm is engaged. More precisely we focus on the cases 
where the target firm operates in an industry that is regulated or has a large involvement of 
state-owned enterprises11. In general, we find that abnormal returns to targets and acquirers 
are smaller for mergers in regulated industries. 
The difference between the excess return to targets in mergers in unregulated 
industries and the excess return to targets in mergers in regulated industries ranges from 
1.2% to 5.8% and is significant in most cases (see Table 6). For mergers in unregulated 
industries, abnormal returns to targets are positive and significant whereas in the case of 
mergers in regulated industries they are positive although non-significant. Moreover, there 
is a difference of around 15 percentage points in the share of deals with positive excess 
returns to targets between deals in unregulated industries and those in regulated industries 
(see Table 5). Thus, we find that merger premia paid to target shareholders are smaller in 
mergers in regulated industries. In fact, the hypothesis of zero excess returns to targets, at 
short horizons, cannot be rejected for this type of industries. What these results might 
reflect is the existence of regulatory frameworks in certain industries that represent a hostile 
environment that hampers the success of the merger processes. In fact, as it is later argued 
these adverse conditions are more relevant to foreign buyers. 
The difference between the excess return to acquirers in mergers in unregulated 
industries and the excess return to acquirers in mergers in regulated industries varies 
between –0.5% and 2.9% but it is never significant. Abnormal returns to acquirers are 
positive but not significant for mergers in unregulated industries whereas they are negative 
and non-significant for mergers in regulated industries. 
The regulatory character of the industry also seems to be a relevant factor in terms 
of the process of value creation. More precisely, the average joint excess return is always 
positive for mergers in unregulated industries (depending on the window, it ranges from 
0.1% to 2.0%) and always negative for deals in regulated industries (depending on the 
window, it ranges from -0.8% to -4.2%). In fact, around 60% of the deals in regulated 
industries generate negative joint excess returns. The difference in the excess returns 
between unregulated and regulated transactions is above 2.5% and statistically significant. 
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Size of the merging firms 
In order to investigate the relationship between excess returns and the size of the 
merging firms, we have computed the average excess returns to targets, acquirers, and the 
weighted average of both, by quartiles of the size distribution (defined in terms of market 
capitalization and sales, respectively). We have not found a clear relationship between the 
size of the merging firms and the magnitude of the abnormal returns to these firms. If 
anything, mergers involving acquirers with the lowest level of market capitalization display 
the highest value of abnormal returns. 
 
IV. REGRESSION ANALYSIS  
Estimation Methodology: 
We expect the value of excess returns to be correlated with the type of M&A event 
that is announced. Specifically we would like to test for the existence of systematic 
differences in two dimensions: whether the merger takes place between two firms in the 
same country or between firms from two different European countries; and, whether the 
target firm operates in an industry which had (or still has) a large percentage of its total 
activity controlled by state-owned enterprises or that is actively regulated. Additionally, we 
would also like to test whether the success of previous merger processes in the same 
sector helps to explain the degree of excess returns observed in our sample. 
The basic model specification that we use is: 
t
jijjijjij
t
ji IndDCaIndaDCaR ,,,, * υα ++++= 321  
where  Ri,jt  refers to the excess return during a window t from the announcement of a 
merger between the target firm j and the acquiring firm i; αj is a country-specific intercept; 
DC i,j is a dummy that takes the value of 1 if firms i and j are from the same country and zero 
otherwise; and Ind j is a dummy that takes the value of 1 if the industry of the target firm is 
an industry that is regulated or with a large involvement of state-owned enterprises. 
                                                                                                                                                 
11 We consider mineral industries, primary metal industries, transportation, communication, electricity, gas, sanitary services 
and financial institutions as regulated industries: More precisely, these industries correspond to the following 2-digit SIC codes: 
10, 13, 33, 40, 44-45, 48-49, 60-61, 80. 
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The following table summarises the tests on the existence of systematic differences 
in excess returns between national and cross-border mergers, on the one hand, and 
between mergers in regulated and in unregulated industries, on the other. 
Tests on differences in excess returns 
H0: a1+a3=0 No difference between excess returns in national and cross-
border mergers, in mergers in regulated industries. 
H0: a1=0 No difference between excess returns in national and cross-
border mergers, in mergers in unregulated industries. 
H0: a2+a3=0 No difference between excess returns in mergers in regulated 
and mergers in unregulated industries, in national deals. 
H0: a2=0 No difference between excess returns in mergers in regulated 
and mergers in unregulated industries, in cross-border deals. 
 
We first distinguish between the excess returns to acquiring and target firms.  Table 
7 displays the results of the regression analysis of the excess returns to target and 
acquiring shareholders as well as for the weighted average of both excess returns. As was 
already observed in the descriptive statistics, excess returns for target firms are on average 
positive and returns are not significantly different between domestic and international 
mergers (irrespective of the regulatory character of the target industry). Target firms from 
regulated industries do show a significantly lower return than returns to mergers taking 
place in other industries. However, this distribution of excess returns is not uniform by 
nationality of the acquiring firm. When the target firm is acquired by a firm from a different 
country excess returns are significantly lower with a one-month centered negative excess 
return of –12%.  On the other hand, when the acquiring firm is from the same country, 
shareholders of the target firm do not receive significantly different returns than 
shareholders from target firms in other industries.  
We checked whether significant national differences existed among the excess 
returns to shareholders depending on the country of nationality of the target firm by allowing 
country-specific intercepts in equation (1).  Differences in national regulations, approaches 
toward hostile takeover activities, and different degrees of government involvement in 
certain industries can lead to observed differences in the degree of excess return to be 
obtained from an acquisition. On average, there are no differences in excess return to target 
firms due to the country of nationality of the merger. A test of the joint hypothesis that all the 
country-specific intercepts αj are equal in equation (1) could not be rejected.  
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In addition, we tested whether there are cross-country differences in the effects we 
are interested in. The only significant difference we found was in the coefficient of the 
dummy that indicates whether the target firm operates in a regulated industry. More 
precisely, we found that target firms from regulated industries display a significantly lower 
excess return than target firms in other industries only in the cases of France, Germany, 
Portugal, Spain, Ireland and Austria. 
For shareholders of acquiring firms the results are quite different. The evidence 
shown in Table 7 suggests that acquirers’ excess returns are significantly larger when the 
merging firms are from the same country. This effect however is both statistically and 
economically small, implying a 1% to 1.5% excess return for the acquirers’ shareholders 
over a one-week or one-month window. In the case of the one-month centered window this 
effect is non-significant. Moreover, for those mergers where the target firm belongs to a 
regulated industry, there are no differences in excess returns between national and cross-
border mergers. There also do not seem to be significant differences between excess 
returns for acquirers depending on the industry of the target firm. 
This evidence suggests that an acquisition by a foreign company of a firm operating 
in a regulated industry gets heavily penalized by financial markets. One possibility is that 
these mergers destroy value for the overall acquisition, so that the total value created in 
these transactions is negative, or that the acquisition just relocates wealth from the target 
firm shareholders to the acquiring firm.  We test for this possibility by looking at the total 
excess value created from the announcement of a merger. In general, the results displayed 
in Table 7 seem to suggest that merger processes in regulated industries tend to destroy 
value. This effect is particularly clear in the case of a foreign acquiring firm and when we 
use the widest window to compute the excess return measure. 
In order to test whether there are differences in the effects of interest among 
countries with different financial systems and, more precisely, with different corporate 
governance structures, we focus on the behavior of the five largest EU countries testing 
whether the estimated parameters differ between the UK and the Continental economies. 
As a previous step, we repeated the estimation of the basic model restricting the sample to 
those mergers where the target firm belongs to one of the 5 largest EU countries. This 
sample represents around 70% of the total number of transactions in our sample. Basically, 
we observe that the main results found with the larger sample are confirmed. That is: 
• When focusing on cross-border deals, target firms from regulated industries 
display a significantly lower return than those in other industries. 
• As regards excess returns to acquiring firm shareholders, no systematic 
significant difference is found when distinguishing between national or cross-
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border deals or when discriminating according to the regulatory character of the 
industry of the target firm. 
• Mergers in regulated industries destroy value. This effect is significant when the 
acquirer is a foreign firm and we consider a one-month centered window. 
These results are mostly driven by the effects found in mergers with a target from a 
country of Continental Europe, since mergers with a UK target represent slightly less than 
20% of the sample (38 out of 202 observations). Thus, as shown in Table 8, the results for 
the 4 largest EU countries (excluding the UK) broadly reproduce those for the whole sample 
and those obtained for the sample of the 5 largest EU countries. However, the pattern of 
results for the sample of mergers with a UK target is significantly different. Overall, the 
results for this sub-sample are very imprecise given its small size. In the case of excess 
returns to acquirer shareholders we do not find any significant difference. For target 
shareholders, if anything, we find higher returns in national deals than in cross-border ones 
when focussing on mergers in regulated industries. The results for the joint excess returns 
display some significant coefficients. Nevertheless, these results are mostly driven by the 
reduced size of the sample of mergers with a UK target and, in particular, by the fact that 
within that sample there are only 2 cross-border deals in regulated industries with market 
capitalization data available. Thus, when we drop the interaction term from the regression, 
the rest of the coefficients significantly change. 
Kleiner and Klodt (2002) have documented the existence of several merger waves 
throughout the last century, highlighting the fact that during these episodes M&A activities 
tend to cluster by industry. They argue that this sectoral clustering supports the hypothesis 
that sectoral shocks cause merger waves. More precisely, these shocks that affect the 
profitability of engaging in corporate restructuring are industry-specific and mostly related to 
technological innovations or regulatory changes. Therefore, we need to take into account 
that the existence of these shocks might be driving our reported results on the value 
creation of mergers in regulated industries. 
 To the extent that consolidation through merger activity was the optimal response to 
these sectoral shocks, we could expect merger activity to result in positive value creation in 
the industry. On the other hand, if mergers in the same industry destroy value this could be 
suggesting that there was an initial misperception of the potential benefits of a merger as a 
way of taking advantage of the changed (technological or regulatory) environment. In this 
respect, we would like to test whether the “success” of previous merger processes in the 
same sector helps to explain the degree of excess returns observed in our sample. For this 
purpose, we estimate our basic specification extended with a variable that tries to proxy this 
“success”. We consider two alternative proxies. MWE is the average of the joint excess 
returns (computed for a window centered around the announcement date with a radius of 
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one-month) of the mergers that have taken place in the European Union in the same 
industry in the previous six months. Analogously, MWN restricts the computation of the 
average joint excess returns to those mergers in which the target belongs to the same 
country.  
The results of this test are reported in Table 9. In general, the estimates of the 
coefficients of the basic specification do not significantly differ from those shown in Table 7. 
As regards the estimates for the variables that measure the average excess returns in the 
same industry, these coefficients are always positive. In the case of the 1-month centered 
window this effect is always significant (except in the equation of target excess returns 
when using MWE). In the case of the 1-week non-centered window, the merger wave 
variables are significant in the equation of acquirer excess returns. To sum up these results, 
the degree of success of previous mergers in the same industry matters to explain the size 
of excess returns. This is especially the case for the excess returns to acquiring firm 
shareholders. The effect is more evident when we focus on the excess returns over a longer 
window and we use a merger wave variable that only takes into account those mergers that 
have taken place in the same country. 
Moreover, we expect that the average excess returns of previous merger deals in 
the same industry affect the excess returns arising from a merger announcement only if 
these average excess returns are positive. If previous merger processes in the same 
industry have not been successful, we should not expect new merger announcements in the 
same industry unless the incentives for the merger are different from those in previous 
deals. In such a case, we should not expect any effect from average excess returns in 
previous mergers on the degree of success of a new merger deal. We have tested this idea 
by splitting MWN in two variables: MWN+ that is equal to MWN if MWN is positive and zero 
otherwise, and MWN- that is equal to MWN if MWN is negative and zero otherwise. We 
construct MWE+ and MWE- analogously. In the regression for acquirers’ excess returns, we 
found the expected result: MWN+ (or MWE+) is positive and significant whereas MWN- (or 
MWE-) is not significant. However, the results are not as clear in the case of targets (i.e. 
MWN- or MWE- are significant in some cases). 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
The process of economic integration, the deregulation of economic activity in many 
sectors and the financial integration of national economies in the EU during the last decade 
have stimulated an important restructuring of companies operating in the European Union, 
and particularly in those countries that belong to the euro area. Nevertheless, this 
restructuring process was also part of a broader wave of mergers and acquisitions among 
corporations from industrial countries. As a result, the volume of M&A activity in the 
European Union did not differ significantly from the evolution of this activity in the US. 
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Although, it is true that the number of M&A transactions involving firms from the euro area 
increased at a faster rate during the period 1998-2000, most of this increase was due to 
domestic mergers that have increased the concentration of activity in certain sectors within 
national borders.  
In this paper we have performed an analysis of shareholder value creation upon the 
announcement of M&As involving European Union firms. We find that target shareholders 
receive on average a positive and significant excess return from the announcement of the 
merger. Conversely, the mean excess return to shareholders of the acquiring firms is not 
significantly different from zero. In fact, returns to acquiring firms were negative in almost 
55% of the transactions. These results are consistent with previous findings in the merger 
literature reporting zero and negative return to acquiring firms (Bruner, 2001). 
The analysis provided here of shareholder value creation from M&A activity in 
Europe indicates that mergers in industries that had been previously under government 
control or operating in heavily regulated environments generate lower value than M&A 
announcements in unregulated industries. This low value creation in regulated industries 
becomes significantly negative when the merger involved two firms from different euro area 
countries and was primarily due to the lower positive return that shareholders of the target 
firm enjoyed upon the announcement of the merger. This evidence is consistent with the 
existence of obstacles to the successful conclusion of the merger -such as cultural, legal, or 
transaction barriers similar to those often emphasized in discussions about the creation of a 
truly integrated financial market in Europe (Lamfalussy et al., 2001)- that decrease the 
probability that the merger will actually be completed as announced and, therefore, its 
expected value. 
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Table 1 
Summary of Shareholder Return Studies for M&A 
 
Panel A: Returns to the Target Firm Shareholders 
 
Study Cumulative Abnormal Sample Sample Event % Pos. Notes 
 Returns Size Period Window Returns  
 (% or avg$/acq)   (days)   
       
Maquieira et al. (1998) +41.65% conglomerate 
+38.08% non-congl. 
47 
55 
1963-96 (-60,60) 61.8% 
83.0% 
Study of returns for 
conglomerate and non-
conglomerate stock-for-stock 
mergers. 
Mulherin and Boone (2000) +21.2% 376 1990-1999 (-1,+1) N/A  
Mulherin (2000) +10.14% 202 1962-97 (-1,0) 76% A sample of incomplete 
acquisitions. 
DeLong (2001) +16.61% 280 1988-95 (-10,1) 88.6% Studied deals in which at least 
one party is a bank. 
+15.58%  27 
+24.60%  37 
Houston et al. (2001) 
+20.80%  64 
1985-90 
1991-96 
1985-96 
(-4,1) N/A Deals in which both parties are 
banks. 
Martínez-Jerez  (2002) 13,62% 335 1990-1998 (-1,1) 82% pooling of interests versus 
purchases 
Kuipers-Miller-Patel  (2002) 35,83% 
 
32,22% 
3,60% 
23,07% 
181  1982-1991 AD-20 to ED+5 
 
AD-5 to ED+5 
AD-20 to AD-6 
AD-1 to AD 0 
N/A AD first announc. date of any 
bid for US target and the 
announc. date of the acquirer's 
first bid for foreign acquirers 
ED corresponding effective date 
of the final bid for the target 
-9,44% (-8,-3) months 
2,41% (-2,-1) months 
17,82% (0,+1) months 
20,23% (-2,+1) months 
-2,39% (+1,+5) months 
9,04% 
474 
(-8,+5)months 
Domestic Acquisitions 
-7,60% (-8,-3) months 
9,06% (-2,-1) months 
21,97% (0,+1) months 
31,03% (-2,+1) months 
1,30% (+1,+5) months 
Danbolt (2002) 
 
22,44% 
106 
1986-1991 
(-8,+5)months 
N/A 
Cross-Border  Acquisitions 
14,16% (-20,0) 72 
12,31% (-10,0) 73 
11,23% (-5,0) 68 
11,38% (-2,0) 74 
10,48% (-1,0) 70 
8,27% 0 64 
12,39% (-1,+1) 71 
13,54% (-2,+2) 75 
13,35% (-5,+5) 71 
14,39% (-10,+10) 76 
P.Beitel-D.Schiereck-
M.Wahrenburg (2002) 
16% 
98 1985-2000 
(-20+20) 75 
Targets worldwide  being 
acquired by European banks 
8.48 (-7,0) N/A Karceski, Ongena and Smith 
(2000) 
 
-1.52 
39  1983-1996 
(+1,7)  
Banks with commercial 
customers in Norway. 
 
-0,9% 4 upper (-30,+30) N/A 
4,5% 4 lower (-30,+30)  
-2% 4 upper (-5,+5)  
-1,9% 4 lower (-5,+5)  
M&A within Corporate Groups  
Market –Adjusted models 
1,4% 11 (-30,+30)  
Buysschaert-Deloof-Jeggers 
(2002) 
-1,3% 11 
1993-1996 
(-5,+5)  
M&A  between  a holding 
company and a non-group buyer 
or seller 
 
Notes: 
Unless otherwise noted, event date is announcement date of merger/bid
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Panel B: Returns to Acquiring Firm Shareholders 
 
Panel B1: Studies Reporting Negative Returns to Acquirers 
 
Study Cumulative Sample Size Sample Period Event Window % Pos. Notes 
 Abnormal Returns   (days) Returns  
       
Mulherin and Boone (2000) -0.37% 281 1990-1999 (-1,+1) N/A  
Mitchell, Stafford (2000) -0.14% 1 
-0.07% 
366 1961-1993 (-1,0) N/A Fama and French 3-
Factor Model, applied 
to monthly returns 
-0.84%2 41.4% Walker (2000) 
-0.77% 
278 1980-1996 (-2,+2) 
46.4% 
 
DeLong (2001) -1.68% 280 1988-95 (-10,1) 33.6% Deals in which at 
least one party is a 
bank. 
Houston et al. (2001) -4.64%  
-2.61%  
-3.47%  
27 
37 
64 
1985-90 
1991-96 
1985-96 
(-4,1) N/A Deals in which both 
parties are banks 
-2,93% 335 1990-1998 (-1,1) 32% 
-2,12% 
-2,14% 
138 US target 1990-1998 AD-20 to ED+5 
AD-5 to ED+5 
N/A AD first announc. 
date of any bid for US 
target and the 
announc. date of the 
acquirer's first bid for 
foreign acquirers. 
Martínez-Jerez  (2002) 
-1,32% 
-0,06% 
-0,92% 
138 US target 1990-1998 AD-5 to AD+5 
AD-20 to AD-6 
AD-1 to AD 0 
ED corresponding 
effective date of the 
final bid for the target
P.Beitel-D.Schiereck-
M.Wahrenburg (2002) 
-0,14% 
-0,01% 
-0,20% 
98 1985-2000 0 
(-1,+1) 
(-20+20) 
46 Targets worldwide  
being acquired by 
European banks 
 
Notes: 
Unless otherwise noted, event date is announcement date of merger/bid 
1 Top return is based on an equal-weighted benchmark portfolio. Bottom-return is based on a value-weighted benchmark 
portfolio. 
2 Top return is a return adjusted for average market  returns. Bottom return is adjusted for return on a matched firm.
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Panel B2: Studies Reporting Zero or Positive Returns to Acquirers 
 
Study Cumulative Abnormal Sample Sample Event % Pos. Notes 
Returns Size Period Window Returns  
    (days)   
       
+6.14% non- 
conglomerate deals 
55 61.8% Maquieira et al. 
(1998) 
-4.79% conglomerate 47 
1963-96 (-60,60) 
36.2% 
Study of returns in 
conglomerate and non-
conglomerate stock-for-stock 
deals 
Mulherin (2000) +0.85% 161 1962-97 (-1,0) 49% A sample of incomplete 
acquisitions. 
1.37% cash deals 961 
1.09% stock 673 
Kohers and 
Kohers (2000) 
1.26% whole sample 1634 
1987-96 (0,1) N/A Sample of mergers among high-
tech firms. 
1,60% N/A Related sample Raj and Forsyth (2001) 
0,75% 
340 1994-98 (-15,+15) 
 Unrelated sample 
Floreani and Rigamonti 
(2001) 
3.65% 56 1996-2000 (-20,+2) N/A Insurance companies 
0,42% (-20,0) 53 
0,14% (-10,0) 57 
0,38% (-5,0) 53 
0,07% (-2,0) 52 
0,06% (-1,0) 53 
0,18% (-2,+2) 42 
0,46% (-5,+5) 46 
P.Beitel-D.Schiereck-
M.Wahrenburg (2002) 
0,24% 
98 1985-2000 
(-10,+10) 52 
Targets worldwide being 
acquired by European banks 
6,0% 3 upper (-30,+30) N/A 
1,7% 4 lower (-30,+30)  
7,2% 3 upper (-5,+5)  
5,9% 4 lower (-5,+5)  
M&As within Corporate Groups 
Market–Adjusted models 
6,7% 11 (-30,+30)  
Buysschaert-Deloof-
Jeggers 
(2002) 
1,8% 11 
1993-1996 
(-5,+5)  
M&As between a holding 
company and a non-group buyer 
or seller 
 
Notes: 
Unless otherwise noted, event date is announcement date of merger/bid 
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Table 2 
 
Studies Reporting total Value Creation from an M&A 
Combined returns to shareholders of acquiring firm and target firm 
 
Study Cumulative Sample 
Size 
Sample Event % Pos. Notes 
 Abnormal Returns  Period Window Returns  
    (days)   
       
Mulherin, Boone (2000) +3.56% 281 1990-1999 (-1, +1) N/A  
Mulherin (2000) +2.53% 116 1962-97 (-1,0) 66% A sample of incomplete 
acquisitions. 
+0.14%  27 1985-90 
+3.11% 37 1991-96 
Houston et al. 
(2001) 
+1.86% 64 1985-96 
(-4,1) N/A Deals in which both 
parties are banks. 
5,03% AD-20 to 
ED+5 
N/A AD first announc. date of any bid for 
US target and the announc. 
4,27% AD-5 to ED+5 date of the acquirer's first bid for 
foreign acquirers. 
3,77% AD-5 to AD+5 ED corresponding effective date of 
the final bid for the target 
0,75% AD-20 to AD-
6 
Kuipers-Miller-Patel  
(2002) 
2,99% 
120 1982-1991 
AD-1 to AD 0 
2,01% (-20,0) 63 
1,46% (-10,0) 64 
1,43% (-5,0) 63 
1,38% (-2,0) 69 
1,20% (-1,0) 65 
0,91% 0 55 
1,40% (-1,+1) 59 
1,70% (-2,+2) 62 
1,45% (-5,+5) 62 
1,35% (-10,+10) 64 
P.Beitel-D.Schiereck-
M.Wahrenburg(2002) 
1,29% 
98 1985-2000 
(-20+20) 58 
Targets worldwide  being acquired by 
European banks 
0,05% (-5,0) 37 
0,45% (-4,0) 
0,42% (-3,0) 
0,37% (-2,0) 
2,07% (-1,0) 
3,2% 0 
4,41% (0,+1) 
5,89% (0,+2) 
5,52% (0,+3) 
5,65% (0,+4) 
5,73% 
80 1995-1999 
(0,+5) 
Value creating business combinations 
N=37 
-0,61% (-5,0) 
-0,96% (-4,0) 
-1,10% (-3,0) 
-1,56% (-2,0) 
-1,56% (-1,0) 
-2,63% 0 
-3,59% (0,+1) 
-4,38% (0,+2) 
-4,04% (0,+3) 
-4,29% (0,+4) 
Nihat Aktas-Eric Bodt-
Fany Declerck (2001) 
-4,16% 
  
(0,+5) 
Value destroying  business 
combinations  N= 43 
 
Notes: 
Unless otherwise noted, event date is announcement date of merger/bid 
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Targets Acquirers
Austria 8 9
Belgium 5 7
Denmark 8 9
Finland 7 12
France 37 38
Germany 68 64
Greece 17 16
Ireland 2 3
Italy 33 38
Luxembourg 1 1
Netherlands 12 13
Portugal 13 14
Spain 26 18
Sweden 13 10
UK 38 36
Targets Acquirers
Agriculture, For. and Fish. 1 0
Mineral Ind. and Constr. 17 19
Manufacturing 92 83
Transp, Comm. and Utilities. 32 37
Distribution 23 13
Finance, Ins. and Real Estate 93 119
Service Industries 30 17
1998
1999
2000
National
Cross-border
Regulated
90
64
Panel C.  Other characteristics
41
77
170
Panel A.  Breakdown by Country
Table 3. Sample Composition
Panel B.  Breakdown by Industry
198
Distribution of the number of M&A announcements by country, 
industry, time, and number of cross-border transactions, and of 
those taking place in a regulated industry in a sample of 288 
M&A announcements.  These merger announcements all took 
place among publicly traded firms in the European Union during 
the period 1998-2000.
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(t-1,t+5) (t-1,t+28) (t-7,t+7) (t-30,t+30)
Excess return 3.44% ** 2.76% ** 5.78% ** 9.09% **
t-stat 6.02 2.87 7.43 7.14
-2.07 -2.24 -2.08 -2.04
1.98 1.91 1.88 2.06
Excess return 3.47% ** 3.13% ** 6.30% ** 9.29% **
t-stat 4.93 2.58 6.53 5.83
-2.05 -2.05 -2.20 -2.07
1.94 2.11 2.06 2.00
Excess return 3.35% ** 1.97% 4.65% ** 8.65% **
t-stat 3.45 1.28 3.55 4.08
-2.57 -2.27 -2.68 -2.32
1.97 2.09 2.01 1.98
Excess return 1.34% 0.01% 4.84% ** 4.56% *
t-stat 1.02 0.03 2.71 1.69
-3.62 -2.89 -4.65 -3.17
1.94 2.06 1.78 1.93
Excess return 4.03% ** 3.55% ** 6.05% ** 10.38% **
t-stat 6.45 3.17 6.95 7.10
-2.25 -2.11 -2.06 -1.92
1.90 1.82 1.83 1.93
Excess return 0.04% -0.55% 0.08% 0.27%
t-stat 0.12 -0.84 0.17 0.26
-2.37 -2.44 -2.43 -2.18
1.86 2.06 2.16 2.15
Excess return 0.47% -0.09% 0.49% 1.37%
t-stat 1.00 -0.11 0.78 1.02
-2.52 -2.21 -2.40 -2.11
1.98 2.24 1.98 2.17
Excess return -0.90% * -1.54% -0.82% -2.14%
t-stat -1.94 -1.56 -1.22 -1.50
-2.20 -2.32 -2.21 -2.04
2.11 2.15 2.25 2.43
Excess return -0.64% -0.20% -0.55% -1.99%
t-stat -1.01 -0.15 -0.60 -1.07
-1.93 -2.30 -2.44 -2.33
3.06 2.01 2.37 2.19
Excess return 0.24% -0.64% 0.26% 0.91%
t-stat 0.59 -0.85 0.47 0.74
-2.20 -2.17 -2.45 -2.47
2.02 2.04 2.20 2.11
*/** denote significance at the 10%/5% level.
5% conf. band
All mergers
National
Table 4. Excess Returns by Type of Merger
Targets
5% conf. band
Cross-border
Regulated
Acquirers
All mergers
5% conf. band
5% conf. band
5% conf. band
Unregulated
5% conf. band
Unregulated
5% conf. band
Regulated
5% conf. band
National
5% conf. band
Cross-border
5% conf. band
Sample mean, t-statistic, and 5% confidence interval of the distribution of excess returns to target, 
acquirer, and value creation of merger announcements.  Value creation is measured as the weighted 
average of target and acquirer returns.  Excess returns are calculated as the difference between 
shareholder returns and expected shareholder returns, measured using the CAPM. Each column of the 
table reports the statistics for the distribution of excess returns over four intervals around the 
announcement date, t. The 5% confidence interval on the distribution of excess returns has been adjusted 
for skewness following the method described in Lyon et al.  (1999). 
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M
ean 
%
 of pos.
M
ean 
%
 of pos.
M
ean 
%
 of pos.
M
ean 
%
 of pos.
M
ean 
%
 of pos.
Target Excess R
eturns
(t-1,t+5)
3.44%
59.2%
3.47%
59.5%
3.35%
58.4%
1.34%
46.0%
4.03%
62.9%
(t-1,t+28)
2.76%
53.5%
3.13%
54.4%
1.97%
51.7%
0.01%
39.7%
3.55%
57.5%
(t-7,t+7)
5.78%
59.9%
6.30%
61.0%
4.65%
57.3%
4.84%
57.1%
6.05%
60.6%
(t-30,t+30)
9.09%
63.7%
9.29%
63.6%
8.65%
64.0%
4.56%
50.8%
10.38%
67.4%
Acquirer Excess R
eturns
(t-1,t+5)
0.04%
48.6%
0.47%
49.7%
-0.90%
46.1%
-0.64%
49.2%
0.24%
48.4%
(t-1,t+28)
-0.55%
44.7%
-0.09%
44.6%
-1.54%
44.9%
-0.20%
42.9%
-0.64%
45.2%
(t-7,t+7)
0.08%
48.9%
0.49%
51.3%
-0.82%
43.8%
-0.55%
46.0%
0.26%
49.8%
(t-30,t+30)
0.27%
48.2%
1.37%
49.7%
-2.14%
44.9%
-1.99%
42.9%
0.91%
49.8%
Joint Excess R
eturns(1)
(t-1,t+5)
0.64%
53.5%
1.24%
56.4%
-0.64%
47.2%
-1.04%
46.7%
1.06%
55.2%
(t-1,t+28)
-0.35%
46.5%
0.22%
50.6%
-1.59%
37.5%
-2.06%
31.1%
0.07%
50.3%
(t-7,t+7)
0.94%
56.1%
1.64%
60.3%
-0.57%
47.2%
-0.78%
44.4%
1.36%
59.0%
(t-30,t+30)
0.81%
50.0%
1.91%
52.6%
-1.58%
44.4%
-4.20%
35.6%
2.04%
53.6%
(1) D
ata on value creation are only available for 231 m
erger deals.
M
ergers in unreg. inds.
Table 5.  Average excess returns and %
 of m
ergers w
ith positive excess returns
All m
ergers
N
ational m
ergers
C
ross-border m
ergers
M
ergers in regulated inds
Sam
ple statistics of the distribution of excess returns to target, acquirer, and value creation, m
easured as the weighted average of target and acquirer 
returns, of m
erger announcem
ents.  Excess returns are calculated as the difference between shareholder returns and expected shareholder returns, 
m
easured using the C
APM
. Each row reports the statistics on excess returns for four intervals around the announcem
ent date, t. 
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(t-1,t+5) (t-1,t+28) (t-7,t+7) (t-30,t+30)
Cross-border 3.35% 1.97% 4.65% 8.65%
Targets National 3.47% 3.13% 6.30% 9.29%
Diff -0.12% -1.16% -1.66% -0.64%
p-value 0.47 0.30 0.20 0.41
Cross-border -0.90% -1.54% -0.82% -2.14%
Acquirers National 0.47% -0.09% 0.49% 1.37%
Diff -1.38% ** -1.45% -1.31% -3.51% *
p-value 0.04 0.15 0.11 0.06
Cross-border -0.64% -1.59% -0.57% -1.58%
Value National 1.24% 0.22% 1.64% 1.91%
creation (1) Diff -1.88% ** -1.81% -2.21% ** -3.48% *
p-value 0.01 0.12 0.03 0.07
Non-regulated 4.03% 3.55% 6.05% 10.38%
Targets Regulated 1.34% 0.01% 4.84% 4.56%
Diff 2.70% ** 3.54% * 1.21% 5.82% **
p-value 0.04 0.07 0.29 0.04
Non-regulated 0.24% -0.64% 0.26% 0.91%
Acquirers Regulated -0.64% -0.20% -0.55% -1.99%
Diff 0.87% -0.45% 0.81% 2.90%
p-value 0.16 0.61 0.25 0.13
Non-regulated 1.06% 0.07% 1.36% 2.04%
Value Regulated -1.04% -2.06% -0.78% -4.20%
creation (1) Diff 2.10% 2.13% 2.14% 6.24%
p-value 0.02 ** 0.12 0.05 ** 0.01 **
*/** denote significance at the 10%/5% level.
(1) Data on value creation are only available for 231 merger deals.
Table 6. Differences in Excess Returns by Type of Merger
Regulated vs. non-regulated
National vs. Cross-border
Differences in mean excess returns to target, acquirer, and value creation between national and 
cross-border mergers and between mergers in regulated and unregulated industries.  Excess 
returns are calculated as the difference between shareholder returns and expected shareholder 
returns, measured using the CAPM. Each column of the table reports the statistics for the 
distribution of excess returns over four intervals around the announcement date, t. 
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(1)
(2)
(1)
(2)
(1)
(2)
(1)
(2)
(1)
(2)
(1)
(2)
C
onstant
4.80
**
c.s.
11.93
**
c.s.
-0.81
c.s.
-1.27
c.s.
-0.22
c.s.
0.30
c.s.
(1.30)
(2.69)
(0.59)
(1.75)
(0.77)
(1.94)
D
C
-1.09
-0.60
-2.21
-2.19
1.48
*
1.11
3.09
0.79
1.77
*
1.20
2.41
0.74
(1.56)
(1.61)
(3.29)
(3.46)
(0.80)
(0.85)
(2.39)
(2.61)
(0.94)
(1.05)
(2.52)
(2.67)
Ind
-5.39
**
-4.06
-12.22
**
-10.77
**
-0.35
-0.70
-3.24
-4.25
-1.44
-1.89
-6.44
**
-6.98
**
(2.39)
(2.58)
(4.18)
(4.39)
(0.99)
(1.12)
(3.13)
(3.59)
(1.39)
(1.48)
(3.00)
(3.41)
D
C*Ind
4.20
3.07
10.02
9.52
-0.63
-0.17
0.97
2.15
-0.61
0.04
1.23
4.01
(3.18)
(3.36)
(6.36)
(6.6)
(1.56)
(1.65)
(4.26)
(4.75)
(1.80)
(1.93)
(4.18)
(4.63)
D
if. in excess returns between:
R
egulated: Nat. vs. C
-B
3.11
2.47
7.81
7.33
0.85
0.94
4.06
2.94
1.16
1.24
3.64
4.75
(H0: a1+a3=0)
0.26
0.40
0.15
0.19
0.53
0.51
0.25
0.44
0.45
0.47
0.28
0.20
U
nregulated: Nat. vs. C-B
-1.09
-0.60
-2.21
-2.19
1.48
*
1.11
3.09
0.79
1.77
*
1.20
2.41
0.74
(H0: a1=0)
0.49
0.71
0.50
0.53
0.07
0.19
0.20
0.76
0.06
0.26
0.34
0.78
N
ational: Reg. vs. unreg.
-1.19
-0.99
-2.20
-1.25
-0.98
-0.87
-2.27
-2.10
-2.05
*
-1.85
-5.21
*
-2.97
(H0: a2+a3=0)
0.57
0.65
0.65
0.81
0.41
0.47
0.43
0.50
0.08
0.14
0.07
0.35
C
ross-border: Reg. vs. unr.
-5.39
**
-4.06
-12.22
**
-10.77
**
-0.35
-0.70
-3.24
-4.25
-1.44
-1.89
-6.44
**
-6.98
**
(H0: a2=0)
0.03
0.12
0.00
0.02
0.72
0.54
0.30
0.24
0.30
0.20
0.03
0.04
*/** denote significance at the 10%
/5%
 level.
Standard errors in brackets. p-values in italics.
Four observations with excess returns above 100%
 were considered as outliers and dropped from
 the sam
ple for estim
ation purposes.
(t-1,t+5)
(t-30,t+30)
Targets
Table 7. Regression analysis of excess returns. Basic specification
(t-1,t+5)
(t-30,t+30)
Acquirers
Value creation
(t-1,t+5)
(t-30,t+30)
Estim
ated coefficients of equation (1) in a sam
ple of 284 m
erger and acquisition announcem
ents.  For each return window, colum
n (1) refers to the estim
ation of equation (1) without allowing 
for target country fixed effects, and colum
n (2) reports estim
ated param
eters for equation (1). 
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C
ont. E.
U
.K
C
ont. E.
U
.K
C
ont. E.
U
.K
C
ont. E.
U
.K
C
ont. E.
U
.K
C
ont. E.
U
.K
C
onstant
5.20
**
0.53
10.39
9.92
-0.59
-0.55
0.52
-0.21
0.70
-2.13
-0.04
3.71
**
(1.61)
(2.63)
(3.50)
(9.84)
(0.91)
(1.46)
(2.74)
(4.24)
(1.13)
(1.52)
(3.05)
(1.37)
D
C
4.39
18.82
11.58
*
26.87
-1.54
-0.94
5.40
0.40
0.85
-2.36
8.34
*
-22.91
*
(3.20)
(12.79)
(6.43)
(30.79)
(1.97)
(6.61)
(4.82)
(18.27)
(1.82)
(10.97)
(5.01)
(11.63)
Ind
-6.98
**
-8.51
-12.60
**
-5.80
-0.15
-1.00
-4.74
2.63
-2.12
-5.61
-6.37
*
-3.48
(1.94)
(7.30)
(4.54)
(19.11)
(1.19)
(3.80)
(3.68)
(6.00)
(1.36)
(7.11)
(3.64)
(10.35)
D
C
*Ind
-1.54
4.95
-4.02
4.61
1.23
1.01
-1.73
-3.65
0.43
5.00
**
-0.88
*
-2.09
(1.93)
(3.46)
(4.26)
(10.78)
(1.17)
(1.79)
(3.35)
(6.05)
(1.33)
(1.76)
(3.64)
(4.87)
D
if. in excess returns betw
een:
R
egulated: N
at. vs. C
-B
2.85
23.77
*
7.56
31.48
-0.31
0.07
3.67
-3.25
1.28
2.64
7.46
**
-25.00
**
(H
0 : a1+a3=0)
0.27
0.06
0.12
0.28
0.85
0.99
0.29
0.85
0.31
0.81
0.03
0.02
U
nregulated: N
at. vs. C
-B
4.39
18.82
11.58
*
26.87
-1.54
-0.94
5.40
0.40
0.85
-2.36
8.34
*
-22.91
**
(H
0 : a1=0)
0.17
0.14
0.07
0.38
0.44
0.89
0.26
0.98
0.64
0.83
0.10
0.05
N
ational: R
eg. vs. unreg.
-8.52
-3.56
-16.62
-1.19
1.08
0.01
-6.47
-1.02
-1.69
-0.61
-7.25
-5.57
**
(H
0 : a2+a3=0)
0.31
0.33
0.82
0.38
0.28
0.72
0.83
0.86
0.30
0.34
0.57
0.00
C
ross-border: R
eg. vs. unr.
-6.98
**
-8.51
-12.60
**
-5.80
-0.15
-1.00
-4.74
2.63
-2.12
-5.61
-6.37
*
-3.48
(H
0 : a2=0)
0.00
0.25
0.01
0.76
0.90
0.79
0.20
0.66
0.12
0.43
0.08
0.74
*/** denote significance at the 10%
/5%
 level.
Standard errors in brackets. p-values in italics.
Four observations w
ith excess returns above 100%
 w
ere considered as outliers and dropped from
 the sam
ple for estim
ation purposes.
(t-1,t+5)
(t-30,t+30)
Targets
Table 8. Regression analysis of excess returns. Continental Europe vs. United Kingdom
(t-1,t+5)
(t-30,t+30)
Acquirers
Value creation
(t-1,t+5)
(t-30,t+30)
Estim
ated coefficients of equation (1) for excess returns to target, acquirer and total value generated by the m
erger. For each case the estim
ated coefficients for tw
o different sam
ples are 
reported. The first colum
n reports results for the m
ergers and acquisitions in w
hich the target firm
 w
as from
 G
erm
any, France, Italy or Spain.  The second colum
n reports results for m
ergers 
and acquisitions w
here a U
K firm
 w
as the target. 
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(1)
(2)
(1)
(2)
(1)
(2)
(1)
(2)
(1)
(2)
(1)
(2)
C
onstant
6.16
**
6.12
**
12.16
**
12.00
**
-0.91
-0.98
-1.60
-1.82
0.12
0.06
-0.22
-0.41
(1.59)
(1.59)
(2.95)
(2.99)
(0.68)
(0.66)
(1.88)
(1.83)
(0.82)
(0.81)
(1.89)
(1.86)
D
C
-1.82
-1.60
-2.19
-1.46
1.36
1.71
**
2.10
3.29
1.18
1.46
1.79
2.82
(1.88)
(1.86)
(3.65)
(3.68)
(0.88)
(0.87)
(2.55)
(2.52)
(1.01)
(0.99)
(2.50)
(2.47)
Ind
-7.49
**
-7.51
**
-11.58
**
-11.90
**
-1.05
-0.99
-3.66
-3.22
-2.16
-2.14
-5.24
*
-4.98
(2.98)
(3.03)
(4.75)
(4.97)
(1.03)
(1.09)
(3.86)
(3.44)
(1.36)
(1.47)
(3.20)
(3.08)
D
C
*Ind
3.34
3.42
4.84
5.17
0.65
0.76
0.43
0.74
0.27
0.37
0.87
1.17
(3.48)
(3.56)
(6.33)
(6.49)
(1.57)
(1.62)
(4.95)
(4.77)
(1.84)
(1.94)
(4.29)
(4.33)
M
W
N
13.74
39.43
**
22.96
**
82.77
**
18.31
*
69.45
**
(14.18)
(14.83)
(8.07)
(20.17)
(9.62)
(15.87)
M
W
E
7.19
10.04
15.13
**
63.21
**
11.46
48.65
**
(9.89)
(15.62)
(7.36)
(17.33)
(7.52)
(15.38)
D
if. in excess returns betw
een:
R
egulated: N
at. vs. C
-B
1.52
1.82
2.65
3.71
2.01
2.47
*
2.53
4.03
1.45
1.83
2.66
3.99
(H
0: a1+a3=0)
0.61
0.55
0.61
0.49
0.13
0.07
0.55
0.32
0.35
0.27
0.45
0.26
U
nregulated: N
at. vs. C
-B
-1.82
-1.60
-2.19
-1.46
1.36
1.71
**
2.10
3.29
1.18
1.46
1.79
2.82
(H
0: a1=0)
0.33
0.39
0.55
0.69
0.12
0.05
0.41
0.19
0.25
0.14
0.47
0.25
N
ational: R
eg. vs. unreg.
-4.15
**
-4.09
**
-6.74
-6.73
-0.40
-0.23
-3.23
-2.48
-1.89
-1.77
-4.37
-3.81
(H
0: a2+a3=0)
0.02
0.03
0.11
0.11
0.74
0.85
0.30
0.46
0.13
0.16
0.13
0.22
C
ross-border: R
eg. vs. unr.
-7.49
**
-7.51
**
-11.58
**
-11.90
**
-1.05
-0.99
-3.66
-3.22
-2.16
-2.14
-5.24
*
-4.98
(H
0: a2=0)
0.01
0.01
0.02
0.02
0.31
0.37
0.34
0.35
0.11
0.15
0.10
0.11
*/** denote significance at the 10%
/5%
 level.
S
tandard errors in brackets. p-values in italics.
Four observations w
ith excess returns above 100%
 w
ere considered as outliers and dropped from
 the sam
ple for estim
ation purposes.
(t-1,t+5)
(t-30,t+30)
Targets
Table 9. Im
pact of m
erger w
aves on excess returns
(t-1,t+5)
(t-30,t+30)
A
cquirers
Value creation
(t-1,t+5)
(t-30,t+30)
E
stim
ated coefficients of equation (1), w
ithout target country fixed effects, and w
ith the additional variable M
W
E
(M
W
N
).  The variable M
W
E
 (M
W
N
) is the average of the joint excess 
returns for the w
indow
 [t-30,t+30] of m
ergers that have taken place in the sam
e industry in the European U
nion (involving targets from
 the sam
e country) during the past six m
onths.
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   (a)   t denotes announcement date
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APPENDIX: DATA DESCRIPTION 
The initial sample analyzed in this study consists of 1,038 M&A announcements over 
a three-year period from 1998 to 2000. Each merger in our sample satisfies the following 
selection criteria: a) both the target and acquiring companies are from EU countries and b) 
the merging companies are listed. Once we exclude those transactions in which the target 
and the acquirer is the same company, the sample size drops to 724 deals. This size is 
further reduced when we exclude those mergers where stock returns are not available 
either for the target or for the acquirer. In this sample (unmatched sample) of 688 mergers 
return information is available for 410 target firms and for 561 acquiring firms. Our basic 
sample is that consisting of those transactions where return information for target and 
acquirers is available. This matched sample includes 288 deals. Additional data 
requirements imply further reductions in the sample size. Thus, market capitalization (sales) 
for both merging firms is only available in 231 (204) cases. Table A.1 summarizes this 
information. 
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(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI)
Initial Excluding Unmatched Matched With market With sales 
sample buybacks sample sample value data data
Number of M & As 1038 724 688 288 231 204
With data on target return 540 410 410 288 231 204
With data on acquirer return 688 561 561 288 231 204
  (I)  Original sample
  (V) Excluding those without data on sales
Table A.1. M & As Samples
  (III) Excluding those with a missing value both on target and acquirer return
  (II) Excluding target = acquirer
  (IV) Matched sample (Requiring data both on target and acquirer return)
  (V) Excluding those without data on market value
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